Abstract-The universal secure network coding presented by Silva et al. realizes secure and reliable transmission of a secret message over any underlying network code, by using maximum rank distance codes. Inspired by their result, this paper considers the secure network coding based on arbitrary linear codes, and investigates its security performance and error correction capability that are guaranteed independently of the underlying network code. The security performance and error correction capability are said to be universal when they are independent of underlying network codes. This paper introduces new code parameters, the relative dimension/intersection profile (RDIP) and the relative generalized rank weight (RGRW) of linear codes. We reveal that the universal security performance and universal error correction capability of secure network coding are expressed in terms of the RDIP and RGRW of linear codes. The security and error correction of existing schemes are also analyzed as applications of the RDIP and RGRW.
I. Introduction
In the scenario of secure network coding introduced by Cai et al. [2] , a source node transmits n packets from n outgoing links to sink nodes through a network that implements network coding [1, 11, 13] , and each sink node receives n packets from n incoming links. In the network, there is a wiretapper who observes µ(< n) links. The problem is how to encode a secret message into n transmitted packets at the source node, in such a way that the wiretapper obtain no information about the message in the sense of information theoretic security.
As shown in [6] , secure network coding can be seen as a generalization of the wiretap channel II [18] or secret sharing schemes based on linear codes [3, 5] for network coding. Hence, in secure network coding, the secrecy is realized by introducing the randomness into n transmitted packets as follows. Suppose the message is represented by l packets S 1 , . . . , S l (1 ≤ l ≤ n). Then, the source node encodes (S 1 , . . . , S l ) together with n−l random packets by linear codes, and generates n transmitted packets [6, 17, 21] .
Silva et al. [21] proposed the universal secure network coding that is based on maximum rank distance (MRD) codes [8] . Their scheme was universal in the sense that their scheme guarantees that over any underlying network code, no information about S leaks out even if any n − l links are observed by a wiretapper. As shown in [21] , their scheme with MRD codes is optimal in terms of security and communication rate. However, there exists some restrictions in universal secure network coding with MRD codes. In their scheme, the network must transport packets of size m ≥ n. The MRD code used in the scheme is defined over an F n q m , where F q m is an m-degree field extension of a field F q with order q. Thus, the size of the field F q m increases exponentially with m, and the restriction of MRD codes with m ≥ n invokes the large computational cost for encoding and decoding of MRD codes if n is large. It is undesirable especially in resource constraint environments.
Considering secure network coding without such a restriction, Ngai et al. [17] , and later Zhang et al. [25] , investigated the security performance of secure network coding based on general linear codes. They introduced a new parameter of linear codes, called the relative network generalized Hamming weight (RNGHW), and revealed that the security performance is expressed in terms of the RNGHW. The RNGHW depends on the set of coding vectors of the underlying network code. Hence, the RNGHW is not universal.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the security performance of universal secure network coding based on general linear codes, which is always guaranteed over any underlying network code, even over random network code. This paper defines the universal security performance by the following two criteria. One is called the universal equivocation Θ µ that is the minimum uncertainty of the message under observation of µ(< n) links, guaranteed independently of the underlying network code. The other is called the universal Ω-strong security, where Ω is a performance measure such that no part of the secret message is deterministically revealed even if at most Ω links are observed. The paper [12] proposed a specific construction of the secure network coding that attains the universal (n − 1)-strong security, and such a scheme is called universal strongly secure network coding [20] . Namely, the definition of universal Ω-strong security given in this paper is a generalization of universal strongly secure network coding considered in [12, 20] for the number of tapped links.
In order to express Θ µ and Ω in terms of code parameters, this paper introduces two parameters of linear codes, called the relative dimension/intersection profile (RDIP) and the relative generalized rank weight (RGRW). The RGRW is a generalization of the minimum rank distance [8] of a code. We reveal that Θ µ and Ω can be expressed in terms of the RDIP and the RGRW of the codes. Duursma et al. [5] first observed that the relative generalized Hamming weight [14] exactly expresses the security performance and the error correction capability of secret sharing. Our definitions of RGRW and RDIP are motivated by their result [5] .
Assume that the attacker is able not only to eavesdrop but also to inject erroneous packets anywhere in the network. Also assume that the network may suffer from the rank deficiency of the transfer matrix at a sink node. Silva et al.'s scheme based on MRD codes [21] enables to correct such errors and rank deficiency at each sink node, where its error correction capability is guaranteed over any underlying network code, i.e., universal. This paper also generalizes their result and reveals that the universal error correction capability of secure network coding based on arbitrary linear codes can be expressed in terms of the RGRW of the codes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sect. II presents basic notations, and introduces linear network coding. Sect. III defines the universal security performance and universal error correction capability of secure network coding over wiretap network. Sect. IV defines the RDIP and RGRW of linear codes, and introduces their basic properties. In Sect. V, the universal security performance is expressed in terms of the RDIP and RGRW. The security of existing schemes [12, 20, 21] is also analyzed as applications of the RDIP and RGRW in Examples 17 and 21. Sect. VI gives the expression of the universal error correction capability in terms of the RGRW, and also analyze the error correction of [21] by the RGRW in Example 27.
II. Preliminary

A. Basic Notations
Let H(X) be the Shannon entropy for a random variable X, H(X|Y) be the conditional entropy of X given Y, and I(X; Y) be the mutual information between X and Y [4] . We write |X| as the cardinality of a set X. The entropy and the mutual information are always computed by using log q m .
Let F q stand for a finite field containing q elements and F q m be an m-degree field extension of F q (m ≥ 1). Let F n q denote an n-dimensional row vector space over F q . Similarly, F n q m stands for an n-dimensional row vector space over F q m . Unless otherwise stated, we consider subspaces, ranks, dimensions, etc, over the field extension F q m instead of the base field
⊥ denote a dual code of a code C. A subspace of a code is called a subcode [15] . For C ⊆ F n q m , we denote by C|F q a subfield subcode of C over F q [15] . Observe that dim C means the dimension of C as a vector space over F q m whereas dim C|F q is the dimension of C|F q over F q .
For
B. Linear Network Coding
As in [2, 6, 17, 21, 25] , we consider a multicast communication network represented by a directed multigraph with unit capacity links, a single source node, and multiple sink nodes. We assume that linear network coding [11, 13] This section introduces the wiretap network model with packet errors and the nested coset coding scheme in secure network coding [6, 17, 21, 25] . Then, we define the universal security performance in terms of the universal equivocation and the universal Ω-strong security on the wiretap network model. We also define the universal error correction capability of secure network coding. From now on, only one sink node is assumed without loss of generality. In addition, we focus on the fundamental case of coherent systems in this paper due to the space constraint. But, as in [21] , all analysis in this paper can be easily adapted to the case of noncoherent systems.
A. Wiretap Networks with Errors, and Nested Coset Coding
Following [2, 6, 17, 21, 25] , assume that in the setup of Sect. II-B, there is a wiretapper who has access to packets transmitted on any µ links. Let W be the set of |W| = µ links observed by the wiretapper. Then the packets observed by the wiretapper are given by W T = B W X T , where rows of B W ∈ F µ×n q are the GCV's associated with the links in W.
In the scenario [6, 17, 21, 25] , the source node first regards an m-dimensional column vector space F m×1 q as F q m , and fix l for 1 ≤ l ≤ n. Let S = [S 1 , . . . , S l ] ∈ F l q m be the secret message, and assume that S 1 , . . . , S l are uniformly distributed over F l q m and mutually independent. Under the wiretapper's observation, the source node wants to transmit S without information leakage to the wiretapper. To protect S from the wiretapper, the source node encodes S to a transmitted vector X = [X 1 , . . . , X n ] ∈ F n q m of n packets by applying the nested coset coding scheme [3, 5, 23, 24] on S . In [3, 5] , its special case is called a secret sharing scheme based on linear codes.
be an arbitrary isomorphism. For a secret message S ∈ F l q m , we choose X from a coset ψ(S ) ∈ C 1 /C 2 uniformly at random and independently of S .
Then, the source node finally transmit X over the network coded network. Def. 1 includes the Ozarow-Wyner coset coding scheme [18] as a special case with C 1 = F n q m . Hence, when we set C 1 = F n q m , this is the secure network coding based on Ozarow-Wyner coset coding scheme [6, 17, 21] .
Corresponding to X transmitted from the source node, the sink node receives a vector of N packets Y ∈ F N q m . Here we extend the basic network model described in Sect. II-B to incorporate packet errors and rank deficiency of the transfer matrix A ∈ F N×n q of the sink node. Suppose that at most t errors can occur in any of links, causing the corresponding packets to become corrupted. Then, as [19] , Y can be expressed by
where Z ∈ F is the transfer matrix of Z. We define ρ n − rank A as the rank deficiency of A. In this setup, we want to decode S correctly from Y. If the network is free of errors and the network code used is feasible, X can be always reconstructed from Y T = AX T as described in Sect. II-B. Then, the coset ψ(S ), and hence S , is uniquely determined from X from Def. 1.
B. Definition of Universal Security Performance
The security performance of secure network coding in the above model was measured by the following criterion [17, 25] .
Definition 2 (Equivocation). The minimum uncertainty
As defined in Def. 2, θ µ depends on the underlying network code. In [17, 25] , θ µ for m = 1 was expressed in terms of the relative network generalized Hamming weight (RNGHW) of C 1 and C 2 . The RNGHW is the value determined according to GCV's of all links in the network. Hence, the RNGHW cannot determine the equivocation over random linear network code [10] . Here, we extend Def. 2 by requiring the independence of the underlying network code, as follows.
As defined in Def. 3, Θ µ does not depend on the set of W's in the network. Silva et al.'s universal secure network coding scheme based on MRD codes [21] 
Def. 3 defines the security for the whole components of a message S = [S 1 , . . . , S l ]. Here we focus on the security for every part of S , and give the following definition.
Definition 4 (Universal Ω-Strong Security). Let S Z = (S i : i ∈ Z) be a tuple for a subset Z ⊆ {1, . . . , l}. We say that a secure network coding scheme attains the universal Ω-strong security if we have
As [9, 16, 20] , a scheme with universal Ω-strong security does not leak any |Z| components of S even if at most Ω − |Z| + 1 links are observed by the wiretapper. Moreover, this guarantee holds over any underlying network code as Θ µ . We note that if a scheme achieves the Ω-strong security, the universal equivocation Θ µ for µ = Ω − l + 1 must be Θ Ω−l+1 = H(S ) as shown in Def. 4. However, the converse does not always hold.
The scheme in [12] achieves Ω = n−1 provided m ≥ l+n by nested coset coding with MRD codes. The universal strongly security in [20] is a special case of Def. 4 with Ω = n − 1.
C. Definition of the Universal Error Correction Capability of Secure Network Coding
In the model described in Sect. III-A, the error correction capability of secure network coding, guaranteed over any underlying network code, is defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Universally t-Error-ρ-Erasure-Correcting Secure Network Coding). A secure network coding scheme is called universally t-error-ρ-erasure-correcting, if
i.e., S can be uniquely determined from Y against t errors over any underlying network code with at most ρ rank deficiency.
Silva et al.'s scheme [21, Section VI] is universally t-error-ρ-erasure-correcting when the minimum rank distance [8] of C 1 is greater than 2t + ρ.
IV. New Parameters of Linear Codes and Their Properties
This section introduce the relative dimension/intersection profile (RDIP) and the relative generalized rank weight (RGRW) of linear codes. In the following sections, these parameters are used to characterize the universal security performance and the universal error correction capability of secure network coding.
A. Definition
We first define the relative dimension/intersection profile (RDIP) of linear codes as follows.
Definition 6 (Relative Dimension/Intersection Profile). Let C 1 ⊆ F n q m be a linear code and C 2 C 1 be its subcode. Then, the i-th relative dimension/intersection profile (RDIP) of C 1 and C 2 is the greatest difference between dimensions over F q m of intersections, defined as
for 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
Next, we define the relative generalized rank weight (RGRW) of linear codes as follows.
Definition 7 (Relative Generalized Rank Weight). Let C 1 ⊆ F n q m be a linear code and C 2 C 1 be its subcode. Then, the i-th relative generalized rank weight (RGRW) of C 1 and C 2 is defined by
The relative dimension/length profile and the relative generalized Hamming weight introduced in [14] are equivalent to Eqs. (2) and (3) 
B. Basic Properties of the RDIP and the RGRW, and the Relation between the Rank Distance and the RGRW
This subsection introduces some basic properties of the RDIP and the RGRW, and also shows the relation between the RGRW and the rank distance [8] . These will be used for expressions of the universal security performance and the universal error correction capability of secure network coding.
First, we introduce the following theorem and lemma about the RDIP and the RGRW.
Theorem 8 (Monotonicity of the RDIP). Let C 1 ⊆ F n q m be a linear code and C 2 C 1 be its subcode. Then, the i-th
, are obvious from Def. 6. Recall that
Next we show that the increment at each step is at most 1. 
Proof: First we have
Therefore the RGRW is strictly increasing with i and thus
Next, we show the relation between the rank distance 
. This implies that there always exists some P ∈ F n×n q with rank P = n satisfying
where g 1 , . . . , g d R (V) are linearly independent over F q , and note that P represents the elementary column operation on 
Lemma 11. For a code C 1 ⊆ F n q m and its subcode C 2 C 1 , the first RGRW can be represented as
Proof: M R (C 1 , C 2 ) can be represented as 
where the last equality of Eq. (6) is obtained by
Therefore, Eq. (6) can be rewritten as follows.
Lemma 11 immediately yields the following corollary.
Corollary 12. For a linear code
This shows that M R,1 (·, { 0}) is a generalization of d R (·). Now we present the following proposition that generalizes the Singleton-type bound of the rank distance [8] .
Proposition 13 (Generalization of Singleton-Type Bound). Let C 1 ⊆ F n q m be a linear code and C 2 C 1 be its subcode. Then, the RGRW of C 1 and C 2 is upper bounded by
Proof: We can consider that C 2 is a systematic code without loss of generality. That is, the first dim C 2 coordinates of each basis of C 2 is one of canonical bases of F dim C 2 q m . Let S F n q m be a linear code such that C 1 is a direct sum of C 2 and S. Then, after suitable permutation of coordinates, a basis of S can be chosen such that its first dim C 2 coordinates are zero. Then, the effective length [7] of a code S is less than or equal to n − dim C 2 . Hence we have
from the Singleton-type bound for rank metric [8] .
Here we write κ = min {1, m/(n − dim C 2 )} for the sake of simplicity. Recall that d R (S) = M R,1 (S, { 0}) from Corol. 12, and M R,1 (S, { 0}) ≤ κ(n − dim C 1 ) + 1 holds from Eq. (8).
We shall use the mathematical induction on t. We see that Eq. (9) is true for t = 1. Assume that for some t ≥ 1,
is true. Then, by the monotonicity shown in Prop. 9,
holds. Thus, it is proved by mathematical induction that Eq. (9) holds for 1 ≤ t ≤ dim (C 1 /C 2 ). Lastly, we prove Eq. (7) by the above discussion about the RGRW of S and { 0}. For an arbitrary fixed subspace V ⊆ F n q m , we have dim (C 1 ∩V) ≥ dim (S∩V)+dim (C 2 ∩V), because C 1 is a direct sum of S and C 2 . Hence, dim (C 1 ∩V)−dim (C 2 ∩V) ≥ dim (S ∩ V) holds, and we have M R,i (C 1 , C 2 ) ≤ M R,i (S, { 0}) for 1 ≤ i ≤ dim (C 1 /C 2 ) from Def. 7. Therefore, from the foregoing proof, we have
, and the proposition is proved.
Prop. 13 immediately yields the following corollary. 
Corollary 14. For a linear code
First, we give the following theorem for the universal equivocation Θ µ given in Def. 3 Theorem 16. Consider the nested coset coding in Def. 1. Then, the universal equivocation Θ µ of C 1 , C 2 is given by
Proof: Let B ∈ F µ×n q be an arbitrary matrix. By the chain rule [4] , we have the following equation for the conditional entropy of S given BX T :
Then, from [25, Proof of Lemma 4.2], we have
. By substituting these equations into Eq. (11), we have
By Eq. (10) we have
Thus, by Eq. (12) and Def. 6, the universal equivocation Θ µ is given as follows.
Example 17. The existing schemes [12, 20, 21] used MRD codes as C ⊥ 1 and C ⊥ 2 , where m ≥ n. By Corol. 12, we have [12, 20, 21] .
We then have the following corollary by the RGRW. Corol. 18 shows that the wiretapper obtain no information of S from any M R,1 (C Lemma 1] and Lemma 9, this equation can be rewritten as follows.
Although the message S has been assumed to be uniformly distributed over F 
H(X|S
For the dimension of a subspace {BX T : X ∈ C 1 }, we have
for any distribution of S . By I(S ; BX T ) = H(S )−H(S |BX T ) and Eq. (12) we can see that the equality holds if S is uniformly distributed. Therefore, for fixed B, if I(S ; BX T ) = 0 holds for uniformly distributed S , then the right hand side of Eq. (14) is zero, which implies that I(S ; BX T ) = 0 also holds for arbitrarily distributed S from the nonnegativity of mutual information [4] .
Lastly, we express Ω in Def. 4 in terms of the RGRW. . Then, the value Ω in Def. 4 is given by
Proof: 
. . , S l are mutually independent and uniformly distributed over F q m . Thus, considering a nested coset coding scheme that generates Z {i} from a secret message S i ∈ F q m with D 1 , D 2 , we can see that Z {i} ∈ φ(S i ) ∈ D 1,i /D 2,i is chosen uniformly at random from φ(S i ). Therefore, we have I(S i ; DZ
For an arbitrary subset R ⊆ L\{i}, define a matrix F R that consists of |R| rows of an (l − 1)
Then, from the foregoing proof, we have . By Theorem 20, we see that the scheme [12] attains the universal (n − 1)-strong security in the sense of Def. 4, while [12] proved it by adapting the proof argument in [20] .
As shown in Prop. 19, no information of S is leaked from less than M R,1 (C ⊥ 2 , C ⊥ 1 ) tapped links even if S is arbitrarily distributed. In contrast, S must be uniformly distributed over F l q m to establish Theorem 20. This is because elements of S need to be treated as extra random packets, as in strongly secure network coding schemes [9, 16, 20] .
VI. Universal Error Correction Capability of Secure Network Coding
This section derives the universal error correction capability by the approach of [19, Section III] . Recall that the received packets Y is given by Y T = AX T + DZ T in the setup of Sect. III-A, and that X is chosen from the coset ψ(S ) ∈ C 1 /C 2 corresponding to S by the nested coset coding in Def. 1. From now on, we write X ψ(S ) for the sake of simplicity.
First, we define the discrepancy [19] between X and Y by
where the second equality is derived from [19, Lemma 4] . This definition of ∆ A (X, Y) represents the minimum number r of error packets Z required to be injected in order to transform at least one element of X into Y, as [20, Eq. (9)]. Next, we define the ∆-distance [19] between X and X ′ , induced by ∆ A (X, Y), as
for X, X ′ ∈ C 1 /C 2 .
Lemma 22. For X, X ′ ∈ C 1 /C 2 , we have
Proof: First we have [8] . This lower bound can be achieved by choosing, e.g., Y = XA T . Therefore, from Eq. (17) . Therefore, ∆ A (X,Ȳ) = i and ∆ A (X ′ ,Ȳ) = d − i hold. Let δ A (C 1 /C 2 ) be the minimum ∆-distance given by δ A (C 1 /C 2 ) min δ A (X, X ′ ) : X, X ′ ∈ C 1 /C 2 , X X ′ .
As [19, Theorem 7] , from Lemma 23 and [19, Theorem 3], we have the following proposition.
Proposition 24.
A nested coset coding scheme with C 1 , C 2 is guaranteed to determine the unique coset X against any t packet errors for any fixed A if and only if δ A (C 1 /C 2 ) > 2t.
Here we note that if X is uniquely determined, S is also uniquely determined from Def. 1.
Lemma 25. δ
Proof:
Theorem 26. Consider the nested coset coding in Def. 1. Then, the scheme is a universally (i.e., simultaneously for all A ∈ F N×n q with rank deficiency at most ρ) t-error-ρ-erasurecorrecting secure network coding if and only if M R,1 (C 1 , C 2 ) > 2t + ρ. Example 27. The existing scheme [21] used MRD codes as C 1 , C 2 , where m ≥ n. Then, by Corol. 14, we have M R,1 (C 1 , { 0}) = n − dim C 1 + 1. Since dim (V ∩ C 2 ) = 0 for any V ∈ Γ dim C ⊥ and Corol. 12, the scheme is universally t-error-ρ-erasurecorrecting when M R (C 1 , { 0}) = d R (C 1 ) > 2t + ρ, as shown in [21, Theorem 11] .
